Book
Development of honesty in repeated signaling games
| Τίτλος: | Development of honesty in repeated signaling games |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Leshowitz, Michael I. |
| Στοιχεία εκδότη: | [Greensboro, N.C.] : [University of North Carolina at Greensboro], [2017] |
| Added Details: | NC Digital Online Collection of Knowledge and Scholarship (NCDOCKS) |
| Τύπος εγγράφου: | Monograph |
| Φυσική περιγραφή: | 1 online resource (vii, 40 pages) : illustrations, digital, PDF file 417.60 KB. |
| Supplemental Data: | System requirements: PC, World Wide Web browser, PDF reader. Available online via NCDOCKS. Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
| Περίληψη: | "In a plant-pollinator system, plants have a multitude of potential signals, both visual and olfactory. Some signals are a by-product of pollen and nectar, while other can be positively correlated through pollinator conditioning. Successful pollinators are those able to cross reference signals with prior experiences to determine the integrity of their sender. An honest signal is defined as a signal correlated with an underlying characteristic; in this study: rewards. We examine honest signaling a system where high-yield and low-yield plants compete for visitation of pollinators. We model the scenario as a repeated Sir Philips Sidney game and conclude that honest signaling, in which only high yield plants signal, cannot be a Nash equilibrium because pollinators lose potential resources if they choose to skip over plants during their foraging flights."--Abstract from author supplied metadata |
| Θέματα: | Game theory., Evolution Mathematical models., Théorie des jeux., Évolution Modèles mathématiques., Evolution Mathematical models, Game theory |
| Όροι ευρετηρίου: | dissertations., Academic theses, Academic theses., Thèses et écrits académiques. |
| Σύνδεσμος: | |
| Σημείωση: | Title from PDF title page (viewed Apr 26, 2018). Directed by Jan Rychtár ; submitted to the Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics. Includes bibliographical references (pages 39-40). |
| Other Numbers: | NGU oai:libres.uncg.edu/21932 1004819448 |
| Πηγή συνεισφοράς: | From OAIster®, provided by the OCLC Cooperative. |
| Αριθμός Καταχώρησης: | edsoai.on1004819448 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | OAIster |
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