Academic Journal
Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism
| Τίτλος: | Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism |
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| Συγγραφείς: | Blue, Douglas |
| Πηγή: | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ; volume 109, issue 3, page 897-912 ; ISSN 0031-8205 1933-1592 |
| Στοιχεία εκδότη: | Wiley |
| Έτος έκδοσης: | 2024 |
| Συλλογή: | Wiley Online Library (Open Access Articles via Crossref) |
| Περιγραφή: | We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language , of using infinitary inference rules to secure the determinacy of arithmetical truth on conventionalist grounds. |
| Τύπος εγγράφου: | article in journal/newspaper |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phpr.13084 |
| Διαθεσιμότητα: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13084 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.13084 |
| Rights: | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| Αριθμός Καταχώρησης: | edsbas.EFD8CCDB |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phpr.13084 |
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