Academic Journal
Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision
| Τίτλος: | Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision |
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| Συγγραφείς: | Abeler, J, Huffman, D, Raymond, C |
| Στοιχεία εκδότη: | American Economic Association |
| Έτος έκδοσης: | 2025 |
| Συλλογή: | Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) |
| Περιγραφή: | Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision. This is because some attributes of the incentives become opaque, i.e., workers do not take them into account. In our setting, workers over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmark, improving effciency. We identify contract features, and facets of worker cognitive ability, that matter for opacity. We find that even relatively small degrees of opacity can cause large shifts in behavior. Our results illustrate important implications of complexity and bounded rationality for designing and regulating workplace incentive contracts. |
| Τύπος εγγράφου: | article in journal/newspaper |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Relation: | https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230751 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.20230751 |
| Διαθεσιμότητα: | https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230751 https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f762dd96-0076-4ed5-b1ce-b71e27e2cd6f |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess ; CC Attribution (CC BY) |
| Αριθμός Καταχώρησης: | edsbas.A869DE12 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.20230751 |
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