Stability for Coalition Structures in Terms of the Proportional Partitional Shapley Value

Bibliographic Details
Title: Stability for Coalition Structures in Terms of the Proportional Partitional Shapley Value
Authors: Carreras Escobar, Francisco, Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Contributors: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorísmia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
Source: UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Publisher Information: Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2024.
Publication Year: 2024
Subject Terms: Coalition structure, Teoria de, 05 social sciences, 0211 other engineering and technologies, Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs, economics, 02 engineering and technology, Jocs, Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory, TU cooperative game, 0502 economics and business, Shapley value, Jocs, Teoria de, Stability, Game theory, Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory, Cooperative games (Mathematics), Proportional partitional
Description: Many coalitional values have been introduced in the literature on cooperative games over the last decades, and especially since 2000. The multiplicity of options suggests the convenience of testing the existence of stable coalition structures, in the sense of Hart and Kurz (1983, Econometrica), when payments are made using some of these values. We recall their concept of $$\gamma$$ γ –stability and give results for the proportional partitional Shapley value, introduced by Alonso–Meijide et al (2015, Discrete Appl. Math.), which shares the utility of any coalition proportionally to the Shapley value of the involved players in the original game.
Document Type: Article
File Description: application/pdf
Language: English
ISSN: 2366-6161
0943-0180
DOI: 10.1007/s41412-024-00143-8
Access URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2117/418096
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-024-00143-8
Rights: CC BY
Accession Number: edsair.doi.dedup.....b1740134e990a0d9c743aa9d603c49d5
Database: OpenAIRE
Description
ISSN:23666161
09430180
DOI:10.1007/s41412-024-00143-8