Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index

Bibliographic Details
Title: Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
Authors: Freixas, Josep, LUCCHETTI, ROBERTO
Contributors: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
Source: UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Publisher Information: Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2016.
Publication Year: 2016
Subject Terms: Abstention, Axioms, Decision making process, Power, Voting systems in democratic organizations, Decision Sciences (all), Management Science and Operations Research, 0211 other engineering and technologies, Classificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Classificació AMS::05 Combinatorics::05C Graph theory, 02 engineering and technology, Classificació AMS::90 Operations research, mathematical programming::90B Operations research and management science, 90 Operations research, mathematical programming::90B Operations research and management science [Classificació AMS], 0502 economics and business, Presa de -- Models matemàtics, Voting -- Abstention, Vot -- Models matemàtics, Voting -- Mathematical models, Jocs, Teoria de, Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics, Axiomes, Game theory, Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs [Àrees temàtiques de la UPC], Classificació AMS::90 Operations research, Teoria de, Circuits::94C Circuits, 05 social sciences, Classificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94C Circuits, networks, Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs, Jocs, 94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94C Circuits, networks [Classificació AMS], Decision making -- Mathematical models, mathematical programming::90B Operations research and management science, networks, Abstencionisme electoral, Decisió, 05 Combinatorics::05C Graph theory [Classificació AMS]
Description: In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf’s index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and from abstain to be contrary. We also provide an axiomatization for both indices, and from this a characterization as well of the standard Banzhaf index (the sum of the former two) is obtained. Some examples are provided to show how the indices behave.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5
Document Type: Article
File Description: application/pdf
Language: English
ISSN: 1572-9338
0254-5330
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5
Access URL: https://upcommons.upc.edu/bitstream/2117/84162/1/ANOR-D-14-00775.pdf
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162
https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/anor/anor244.html#FreixasL16
https://re.public.polimi.it/handle/11311/1022007
https://core.ac.uk/display/41828431
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5/fulltext.html
https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/84162
https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v244y2016i2d10.1007_s10479-016-2124-5.html
https://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5
https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1022007
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5
http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0254-5330
Rights: Springer TDM
Accession Number: edsair.doi.dedup.....61c09919f6682ed95ed8771ac1b3f27f
Database: OpenAIRE
Description
ISSN:15729338
02545330
DOI:10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5