Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
| Τίτλος: |
The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition. |
| Συγγραφείς: |
Matsushima, Noriaki1 (AUTHOR) matsushima@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp, Nishikawa, Kazuki2 (AUTHOR), Qiu, Jiaying2 (AUTHOR) |
| Πηγή: |
Contemporary Economic Policy. Aug2026, p1. 24p. 3 Illustrations. |
| Θεματικοί όροι: |
*Minimum wage laws, *Oligopolies, *Corporate profits, *Labor market, *Labor costs, *Duopolies, *Economic competition |
| Περίληψη: |
We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor‐market power interacts with product‐market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variables are strategic substitutes. The mechanism can raise the regulated firm's profit as well as total employment and consumer surplus. We characterize the conditions for profit enhancement and show how labor‐market linkages alter strategic interaction. For instance, in a differentiated‐product Bertrand duopoly with a shared duopsony component, prices can become strategic substitutes, yielding a related profit‐enhancing mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Βάση Δεδομένων: |
Business Source Index |