Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
| Τίτλος: |
AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTALITY OF GOOD. |
| Συγγραφείς: |
THEUNISSEN, L. NANDI1 |
| Πηγή: |
Journal of Philosophy. Jul2026, Vol. 123 Issue 7, p406-432. 27p. |
| Θεματικοί όροι: |
*Excellence, *Values (Ethics), *Theorists, *Philosophers, *Ethics, *Virtue, *Perfectionism (Personality trait) |
| Περίληψη: |
The article discusses the philosophical debate regarding the nature of value, specifically focusing on the relationship between "good simpliciter" and "good for." It examines the arguments of "G theorists," who argue that something is good for a person because it is good simpliciter, and contrasts this with "GF theorists," who propose that excellence is benefit. The text evaluates the arguments presented by G theorists, including their reliance on intuitions about dependence, the primacy of quality over consequences, and the transparency of "good for," ultimately suggesting that GF theorists offer a more compelling account of perfectionist values. [Extracted from the article] |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: |
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