Academic Journal
Концептуальный анализ как методологическое средство аналитической юриспруденции
| Τίτλος: | Концептуальный анализ как методологическое средство аналитической юриспруденции |
|---|---|
| Πηγή: | Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология. |
| Στοιχεία εκδότη: | Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования «Национальный исследовательский Томский государственный университет», 2011. |
| Έτος έκδοσης: | 2011 |
| Θεματικοί όροι: | КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ, АНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЮРИСПРУДЕНЦИЯ, ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ, У.В.О. КУАЙН, W.V.O. QUINE |
| Περιγραφή: | The paper presents a study of the place and importance of conceptual analysis in the methodological arsenal of analytical jurisprudence. The article shows the necessity of conceptual analysis in law, taking into account the specifics of this area of the humanities. Quines view that there is no non-circular way to explicate the notion of analyticity, together with his observation that any claim can be revised in the face of recalcitrant experience, is believed by some to have conclusively refuted traditional views about conceptual analysis and metaphysics. Quines analysis shows, according to these philosophers, that philosophy lacks a distinctive methodology and that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with scientific theorizing. The debate about methodology began in epistemology, but is now prominent in other areas of philosophy including legal philosophy; and there are a number of legal philosophers who accept Quines view that philosophy should abandon conceptual analysis for a scientific methodology. Brian Leiter, the most influential proponent of naturalism in legal philosophy, has complained that legal philosophy is one of the few areas in philosophy that has ignored the damning Quinean criticisms of traditional conceptual analysis. While it is undeniably true that naturalistic philosophy thrives in many areas, traditional conceptual analysis seems to be thriving in all areas of philosophy including, as Leiter suggests, philosophy of law not much has really changed. Theorists in all areas of philosophy continue to do conceptual analysis. Metaphysics continues to thrive, as does conceptual analysis in epistemology, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of law. The concepts of law, free will, mind, knowledge, and goodness are explored in hundreds of published papers every year and the rigorous methodology presupposed in these papers seems distinct from scientific methodology with its foundational reliance on induction and empirical observation. Представлено исследование места и значения концептуального анализа в методологическом арсенале аналитической юриспруденции. Показана необходимость применения концептуального анализа в сфере права, с учетом специфики этой области гуманитарного знания. |
| Τύπος εγγράφου: | Article |
| Περιγραφή αρχείου: | text/html |
| Γλώσσα: | Russian |
| ISSN: | 2311-2395 1998-863X |
| Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: | http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kontseptualnyy-analiz-kak-metodologicheskoe-sredstvo-analiticheskoy-yurisprudentsii http://cyberleninka.ru/article_covers/13996658.png |
| Αριθμός Καταχώρησης: | edsair.od......2806..0b81bdcc3fa1fc431fd4eaee3d373fd6 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | OpenAIRE |
| ISSN: | 23112395 1998863X |
|---|