Academic Journal
Policy experimentation, political competition, and heterogeneous beliefs
| Τίτλος: | Policy experimentation, political competition, and heterogeneous beliefs |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Hélène Ollivier, Leo K. Simon, Antony Millner |
| Συνεισφορές: | Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, UMR 8174, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich (ETH Zürich) |
| Πηγή: | Journal of Public Economics, 120 |
| Publication Status: | Preprint |
| Στοιχεία εκδότη: | Elsevier BV, 2014. |
| Έτος έκδοσης: | 2014 |
| Θεματικοί όροι: | Economics and Econometrics, Beliefs, jel:D83, jel:H40, Learning, Political economy, P48, political economy, D72, 0502 economics and business, jel:P48, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, learning, ddc:330, beliefs, 05 social sciences, jel:D72, Political Economy, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 16. Peace & justice, beliefs, learning, political economy, learning,political economy,beliefs, D83, Finance, H40 |
| Περιγραφή: | We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters' payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies — it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future, thus avoiding facing competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself. The model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to ‘over experiment’, relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods. We thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on parties having conflicting objectives, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. Journal of Public Economics, 120 ISSN:0047-2727 ISSN:1879-2316 |
| Τύπος εγγράφου: | Article Conference object Research |
| Περιγραφή αρχείου: | application/application/pdf |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.008 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2463149 |
| DOI: | 10.3929/ethz-b-000093336 |
| Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60133/1/Millner_etal_Policy-experimentation-political-competition-heterogeneous-beliefs_2014.pdf https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/102116/1/cesifo_wp4839.pdf https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714001935 https://research.monash.edu/en/publications/policy-experimentation-political-competition-and-heterogeneous-be https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60133/ https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60133/1/Millner_etal_Policy-experimentation-political-competition-heterogeneous-beliefs_2014.pdf https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/pseptp/hal-01308618.html http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102116 https://hal.science/hal-01308618v1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.008 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/93336 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60133/ https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01022728/document http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/01/02/27/28/PDF/14050.pdf http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4839.pdf |
| Rights: | CC BY |
| Αριθμός Καταχώρησης: | edsair.doi.dedup.....ecf97b3b26ddcbce43075bae5a527799 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | OpenAIRE |
| ISSN: | 00472727 |
|---|---|
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.008 |