Academic Journal
Why the 'this universe' objection confirms a multiverse.
| Τίτλος: | Why the 'this universe' objection confirms a multiverse. |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Ward, Louis |
| Πηγή: | Synthese; Sep2026, Vol. 208 Issue 3, p1-18, 18p |
| Θεματικοί όροι: | Multiverse theory, Probability theory, Physical cosmology |
| Περίληψη: | Fine-tuning is often taken to support the multiverse over a single-universe hypothesis, but this claim faces the 'this universe' objection. The objection argues that our evidence must be indexically specific, so the relevant evidence is that this universe is finely tuned rather than some universe. Positing many universes then does not make it any more likely that this universe is finely tuned. Requiring indexical specificity of evidence motivates a cosmological argument for the multiverse, since this universe's existence is more likely on a multiverse than on a single-universe hypothesis. Goff (2024) replies that, because there are infinitely many possible universes, it is equally likely that this universe exists if there is one universe or many. In this paper, I present a trilemma against the single-universe hypothesis. First, if we accept both the requirement of indexically specific evidence and the assumption of infinitely many possible universes, then we have probabilistic confirmation of a multiverse. Any hypothesis with a finite number of universes predicts 'this universe exists' with a likelihood of 0, so multiplying this likelihood by its prior results in a posterior of 0. An unlimited multiverse predicts this evidence with probability 1. Provided this infinite multiverse hypothesis has a finite positive prior probability, an infinite multiverse is confirmed over finitely many universes. Second, if the indexical evidence requirement is rejected, the 'this universe' objection fails, and fine-tuning supports a multiverse. Third, if an infinity of possible universes is rejected, Goff's response fails, and the cosmological argument succeeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Synthese is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | Complementary Index |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 CustomLinks: – Url: https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05769-6 Name: EDS - Springer Nature Journals (s7799221) Category: fullText Text: View record at Springer – Url: https://resolver.ebsco.com/c/fiv2js/result?sid=EBSCO:edb&genre=article&issn=00397857&ISBN=&volume=208&issue=3&date=20260901&spage=1&pages=1-18&title=Synthese&atitle=Why%20the%20%27this%20universe%27%20objection%20confirms%20a%20multiverse.&aulast=Ward%2C%20Louis&id=DOI:10.1007/s11229-026-05769-6 Name: Full Text Finder (for New FTF UI) (ns324271) Category: fullText Text: Full Text Finder MouseOverText: Full Text Finder |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Why the 'this universe' objection confirms a multiverse. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Ward%2C+Louis%22">Ward, Louis</searchLink> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: Synthese; Sep2026, Vol. 208 Issue 3, p1-18, 18p – Name: Subject Label: Subject Terms Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Multiverse+theory%22">Multiverse theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Probability+theory%22">Probability theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Physical+cosmology%22">Physical cosmology</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Fine-tuning is often taken to support the multiverse over a single-universe hypothesis, but this claim faces the 'this universe' objection. The objection argues that our evidence must be indexically specific, so the relevant evidence is that this universe is finely tuned rather than some universe. Positing many universes then does not make it any more likely that this universe is finely tuned. Requiring indexical specificity of evidence motivates a cosmological argument for the multiverse, since this universe's existence is more likely on a multiverse than on a single-universe hypothesis. Goff (2024) replies that, because there are infinitely many possible universes, it is equally likely that this universe exists if there is one universe or many. In this paper, I present a trilemma against the single-universe hypothesis. First, if we accept both the requirement of indexically specific evidence and the assumption of infinitely many possible universes, then we have probabilistic confirmation of a multiverse. Any hypothesis with a finite number of universes predicts 'this universe exists' with a likelihood of 0, so multiplying this likelihood by its prior results in a posterior of 0. An unlimited multiverse predicts this evidence with probability 1. Provided this infinite multiverse hypothesis has a finite positive prior probability, an infinite multiverse is confirmed over finitely many universes. Second, if the indexical evidence requirement is rejected, the 'this universe' objection fails, and fine-tuning supports a multiverse. Third, if an infinity of possible universes is rejected, Goff's response fails, and the cosmological argument succeeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: Abstract Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Synthese is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s11229-026-05769-6 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 18 StartPage: 1 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Multiverse theory Type: general – SubjectFull: Probability theory Type: general – SubjectFull: Physical cosmology Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Why the 'this universe' objection confirms a multiverse. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Ward, Louis IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 09 Text: Sep2026 Type: published Y: 2026 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 00397857 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 208 – Type: issue Value: 3 Titles: – TitleFull: Synthese Type: main |
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