Academic Journal
Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness.
| Τίτλος: | Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness. |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Ramstead MJ; UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology: University College London Queen Square, London, UK maxwell.d.ramstead@gmail.com. |
| Πηγή: | The Behavioral and brain sciences [Behav Brain Sci] 2026 Sep 17; Vol. 49, pp. e354. Date of Electronic Publication: 2026 Sep 17. |
| Τύπος έκδοσης: | Journal Article |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Στοιχεία περιοδικού: | Publisher: Cambridge Univ. Press Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 7808666 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1469-1825 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 0140525X NLM ISO Abbreviation: Behav Brain Sci Subsets: MEDLINE |
| Imprint Name(s): | Original Publication: Cambridge [Eng.], New York, Cambridge Univ. Press. |
| Ιατρικοί όροι (MeSH): | Consciousness*/physiology , Neurosciences*/methods , Computer Simulation* , Theory of Mind*, Humans |
| Περίληψη: | This commentary concerns the distinction between computational modelling and computational metaphysics (i.e., the Computational Theory of Mind) in the context of consciousness studies. I argue that the ability to simulate the dynamics of a phenomenon using computational models does not entail that that phenomenon is literally performing the computations that are prescribed by the model. |
| Entry Date(s): | Date Created: 20260917 Date Completed: 20260917 Latest Revision: 20260917 |
| Update Code: | 20260917 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/S0140525X25103580 |
| PMID: | 42750518 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | MEDLINE |
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