Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
| Τίτλος: |
Meatless minds vs. beast machines: Are simulated subjects impossible? |
| Συγγραφείς: |
Dołęga K; Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany krzysztof.dolega@rub.de https://www.krysdolega.xyz., Cleeremans A; Faculté des Sciences Psychologiques et de l'Education, Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium axcleer@ulb.ac.be https://axc.ulb.be. |
| Πηγή: |
The Behavioral and brain sciences [Behav Brain Sci] 2026 Sep 17; Vol. 49, pp. e329. Date of Electronic Publication: 2026 Sep 17. |
| Τύπος έκδοσης: |
Journal Article |
| Γλώσσα: |
English |
| Στοιχεία περιοδικού: |
Publisher: Cambridge Univ. Press Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 7808666 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1469-1825 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 0140525X NLM ISO Abbreviation: Behav Brain Sci Subsets: MEDLINE |
| Imprint Name(s): |
Original Publication: Cambridge [Eng.], New York, Cambridge Univ. Press. |
| Ιατρικοί όροι (MeSH): |
Consciousness*/physiology , Computer Simulation*, Humans |
| Περίληψη: |
We challenge Seth's claim that simulations of consciousness necessarily lack the causal powers or intrinsic properties of real consciousness. We argue that Seth's position risks begging the question against computational functionalism and faces a dilemma over the reducibility of qualia. This weakens his case, leaving open the possibility that simulations could, in principle, realize consciousness. |
| Entry Date(s): |
Date Created: 20260917 Date Completed: 20260917 Latest Revision: 20260917 |
| Update Code: |
20260917 |
| DOI: |
10.1017/S0140525X25103889 |
| PMID: |
42750512 |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: |
MEDLINE |