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The Limits of Repetition in the Illusion of Consensus.

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Τίτλος: The Limits of Repetition in the Illusion of Consensus.
Συγγραφείς: Desai SC; Discipline of Psychology, University of Technology., Alister M; Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley., Ransom K; School of Psychology, Adelaide University., Martin J; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales., Angles L; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales., Perfors A; School of Psychological Science, University of Melbourne., Hayes BK; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales.
Πηγή: Cognitive science [Cogn Sci] 2026 Sep; Vol. 50 (9), pp. e70266.
Τύπος έκδοσης: Journal Article
Γλώσσα: English
Στοιχεία περιοδικού: Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 7708195 Publication Model: Print Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1551-6709 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 03640213 NLM ISO Abbreviation: Cogn Sci Subsets: MEDLINE
Imprint Name(s): Publication: 2009-: Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley-Blackwell
Original Publication: Norwood, N. J., Ablex Pub. Corp.
Ιατρικοί όροι (MeSH): Illusions*/psychology , Consensus*, Humans ; Female ; Adult ; Male ; Young Adult ; Bayes Theorem
Περίληψη: Humans rely on social agreement to assess the credibility of information, but an illusion of consensus can arise through repeated exposure to the same source (dependent consensus), which can make people overestimate credibility. The current work investigated the limits of this illusion across multiple exposures to claims based on either an independent or dependent consensus. In two studies (N = 1015), participants rated their belief in a claim after exposure to an increasing number of consensual claims within a mock social media environment. Initially, when exposed to only a small number of claims, people were equally persuaded by dependent and independent consensus, but independent consensus had a greater impact on beliefs as exposures accumulated. Bayesian nonlinear modeling showed that independent consensus led to a higher asymptotic level of belief and more rapid belief revision than dependent consensus. These effects were robust over variations in claim valence (Experiment 1) and topic (Experiment 2) and were further supported by the free-text justifications participants provided. Our findings show that the illusion of consensus may be less of a concern than previous research suggested, at least in environments where a high amount of repeated exposure to the same claim is common. They also provide some evidence for a novel mechanism contributing to belief in repeated claims, namely, that repetition of such claims by a secondary source is perceived as a proxy for claim credibility.
(© 2026 The Author(s). Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society (CSS).)
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Grant Information: DP250100727 Australian Research Council
Contributed Indexing: Keywords: Consensus; Judgment; Repetition; Social learning
Entry Date(s): Date Created: 20260915 Date Completed: 20260915 Latest Revision: 20260918
Update Code: 20260918
PubMed Central ID: PMC13575296
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.70266
PMID: 42740351
Βάση Δεδομένων: MEDLINE
Περιγραφή
ISSN:1551-6709
DOI:10.1111/cogs.70266