Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference.

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Τίτλος:	Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference.
Συγγραφείς:	Fernbach PM; Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado at Boulder., Bogard JE; Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis.
Πηγή:	Topics in cognitive science [Top Cogn Sci] 2024 Apr; Vol. 16 (2), pp. 187-205. Date of Electronic Publication: 2023 May 18.
Τύπος έκδοσης:	Review; Journal Article
Γλώσσα:	English
Στοιχεία περιοδικού:	Publisher: Cognitive Science Society, Inc Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 101506764 Publication Model: Print-Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1756-8765 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 17568757 NLM ISO Abbreviation: Top Cogn Sci Subsets: MEDLINE
Imprint Name(s):	Original Publication: Hoboken, NJ : Cognitive Science Society, Inc., c2009-
Ιατρικοί όροι (MeSH):	Mass Behavior* , Social Sciences*, Humans ; Knowledge
Περίληψη:	Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes. (© 2023 Cognitive Science Society LLC.)
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Contributed Indexing:	Keywords: Community of knowledge; Confirmation bias; Conspiracy theories; Explanatory coherence; False belief; Flat Earth; Illusion of explanatory depth
Entry Date(s):	Date Created: 20230519 Date Completed: 20240415 Latest Revision: 20250829
Update Code:	20260130
DOI:	10.1111/tops.12662
PMID:	37202921
Βάση Δεδομένων:	MEDLINE

Περιγραφή
ISSN:	1756-8765
DOI:	10.1111/tops.12662