Academic Journal
Προβολή σε EDS

The Political Economy of Antibribery Enforcement.

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Τίτλος: The Political Economy of Antibribery Enforcement.
Συγγραφείς: Cohen, Lauren H.1 (AUTHOR) lcohen@hbs.edu, Li, Bo2 (AUTHOR) boli@gsm.pku.edu.cn
Πηγή: Management Science (INFORMS). Sep2026, Vol. 72 Issue 9, p7841-7869. 29p.
Θεματικοί όροι: *Bribery, *Economic impact, *Financial markets, *Political economic analysis, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (U.S.), United States Congressional elections, Media exposure, Justice administration
Γεωγραφικοί όροι: United States
Εταιρία/Οντότητα: United States. Congress , United States. Dept. of Justice , United States. Securities & Exchange Commission
Περίληψη: Using exogenous variation in the timing and geographic location of U.S. Congressional elections, we find that the probability of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions against foreign firms increases significantly preceding senatorial elections, spiking more than 21%, with no commensurate increase for globally operating domestically headquartered firms in these same senators' states. Using hand-collected case-level data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), we observe that these pre-election cases tend to be weaker overall and that they are brought significantly more often against foreign firms that operate in less-important industries in the senator's state and when they have a smaller overall U.S. presence. This spike in foreign firm targeting is accompanied by a significant spike in traditional and social media coverage coupled with sharply negative sentiment. Furthermore, these enforcement actions and media spikes are associated with electoral consequences, specifically greater vote shares and better poll results for enforcement-state senators. The FCPA enforcement actions have real impacts on firms. These include a 10% reduction in market value after enforcement actions against foreign firms and a significant decrease in credit ratings. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00476. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Management Science (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Βάση Δεδομένων: Business Source Index
FullText Text:
  Availability: 0
CustomLinks:
  – Url: http://www.jstor.org/openurl?issn=00251909&date=2026&volume=72&issue=9&spage=7841
    Name: JSTOR (all content) (s7799221)
    Category: fullText
    Text:
    Icon: https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/branding/jstor/iconJSTOR.gif
    MouseOverText: Full Text from JSTOR
Header DbId: bsx
DbLabel: Business Source Index
An: 197037842
RelevancyScore: 1515
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 1515
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: The Political Economy of Antibribery Enforcement.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Cohen%2C+Lauren+H%2E%22">Cohen, Lauren H.</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> lcohen@hbs.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Li%2C+Bo%22">Li, Bo</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> boli@gsm.pku.edu.cn</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Management+Science+%28INFORMS%29%22">Management Science (INFORMS)</searchLink>. Sep2026, Vol. 72 Issue 9, p7841-7869. 29p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Bribery%22">Bribery</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Economic+impact%22">Economic impact</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Financial+markets%22">Financial markets</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Political+economic+analysis%22">Political economic analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Foreign+Corrupt+Practices+Act+of+1977+%28U%2ES%2E%29%22">Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (U.S.)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States+Congressional+elections%22">United States Congressional elections</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Media+exposure%22">Media exposure</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Justice+administration%22">Justice administration</searchLink>
– Name: SubjectGeographic
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States%22">United States</searchLink>
– Name: SubjectCompany
  Label: Company/Entity
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States%2E+Congress%22">United States. Congress</searchLink> <br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States%2E+Dept%2E+of+Justice%22">United States. Dept. of Justice</searchLink> <br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+States%2E+Securities+%26+Exchange+Commission%22">United States. Securities & Exchange Commission</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: Using exogenous variation in the timing and geographic location of U.S. Congressional elections, we find that the probability of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions against foreign firms increases significantly preceding senatorial elections, spiking more than 21%, with no commensurate increase for globally operating domestically headquartered firms in these same senators' states. Using hand-collected case-level data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), we observe that these pre-election cases tend to be weaker overall and that they are brought significantly more often against foreign firms that operate in less-important industries in the senator's state and when they have a smaller overall U.S. presence. This spike in foreign firm targeting is accompanied by a significant spike in traditional and social media coverage coupled with sharply negative sentiment. Furthermore, these enforcement actions and media spikes are associated with electoral consequences, specifically greater vote shares and better poll results for enforcement-state senators. The FCPA enforcement actions have real impacts on firms. These include a 10% reduction in market value after enforcement actions against foreign firms and a significant decrease in credit ratings. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00476. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Management Science (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsx&AN=197037842
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00476
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 29
        StartPage: 7841
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Bribery
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Economic impact
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Financial markets
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Political economic analysis
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (U.S.)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States Congressional elections
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Media exposure
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Justice administration
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States. Congress
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States. Dept. of Justice
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: United States. Securities & Exchange Commission
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: The Political Economy of Antibribery Enforcement.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Cohen, Lauren H.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Li, Bo
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Text: Sep2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 00251909
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 72
            – Type: issue
              Value: 9
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Management Science (INFORMS)
              Type: main
ResultId 1