Academic Journal
Προβολή σε EDS

Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems.

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Τίτλος: Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems.
Συγγραφείς: Núñez, Marina1 (AUTHOR) mnunez@ub.edu, Robles, Francisco1 (AUTHOR) frobles@ub.edu, Robles, Laura2 (AUTHOR) lroblesjimenez@alixpartners.com
Πηγή: Social Choice & Welfare. Sep2026, Vol. 67 Issue 2, p365-393. 29p.
Θεματικοί όροι: *Market equilibrium, *Resource allocation, Assignment problems (Programming)
Περίληψη: This paper investigates (non-)manipulability properties of Walrasian equilibrium rules in object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences. We focus on assignment problems with indivisible and different objects where each agent is interested in acquiring at most one object. We propose simplified forms of manipulation such as reporting a monotonic transformation of preferences or pretending to be single-minded. We show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule is the unique rule that, among all Walrasian equilibrium rules, is non-manipulable via monotonic transformations at the outside option. Analogously, we also show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule is also the unique Walrasian equilibrium rule that is non-manipulable by pretending to be single-minded. Finally, on the domain of quasi-linear preferences, we introduce a novel axiom: welfare parity for uncontested objects. Under this axiom, when a new object, valued positively by only one agent, enters the market, that agent receives all the resulting welfare gain. We prove that, within this domain, the axiom characterizes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule among all Walrasian equilibrium rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Social Choice & Welfare is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Βάση Δεδομένων: Business Source Index
FullText Links:
  – Type: other
Text:
  Availability: 0
CustomLinks:
  – Url: https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s00355-025-01645-3
    Name: EDS - Springer Nature Journals (s7799221)
    Category: fullText
    Text: View record at Springer
Header DbId: bsx
DbLabel: Business Source Index
An: 196687969
RelevancyScore: 1435
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 1435
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Núñez%2C+Marina%22">Núñez, Marina</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> mnunez@ub.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Robles%2C+Francisco%22">Robles, Francisco</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> frobles@ub.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Robles%2C+Laura%22">Robles, Laura</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> lroblesjimenez@alixpartners.com</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Social+Choice+%26+Welfare%22">Social Choice & Welfare</searchLink>. Sep2026, Vol. 67 Issue 2, p365-393. 29p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Market+equilibrium%22">Market equilibrium</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Resource+allocation%22">Resource allocation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Assignment+problems+%28Programming%29%22">Assignment problems (Programming)</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: This paper investigates (non-)manipulability properties of Walrasian equilibrium rules in object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences. We focus on assignment problems with indivisible and different objects where each agent is interested in acquiring at most one object. We propose simplified forms of manipulation such as reporting a monotonic transformation of preferences or pretending to be single-minded. We show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule is the unique rule that, among all Walrasian equilibrium rules, is non-manipulable via monotonic transformations at the outside option. Analogously, we also show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule is also the unique Walrasian equilibrium rule that is non-manipulable by pretending to be single-minded. Finally, on the domain of quasi-linear preferences, we introduce a novel axiom: welfare parity for uncontested objects. Under this axiom, when a new object, valued positively by only one agent, enters the market, that agent receives all the resulting welfare gain. We prove that, within this domain, the axiom characterizes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium rule among all Walrasian equilibrium rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Social Choice & Welfare is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsx&AN=196687969
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1007/s00355-025-01645-3
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 29
        StartPage: 365
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Market equilibrium
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Resource allocation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Assignment problems (Programming)
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Núñez, Marina
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Robles, Francisco
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Robles, Laura
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Text: Sep2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 01761714
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 67
            – Type: issue
              Value: 2
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Social Choice & Welfare
              Type: main
ResultId 1