Academic Journal
Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing.
| Title: | Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Caspari, Gian1 (AUTHOR), Khanna, Manshu2 (AUTHOR) manshu@phbs.pku.edu.cn |
| Source: | Economic Theory. Aug2026, Vol. 82 Issue 1, p273-303. 31p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Game theory, *Resource allocation, Matching theory, Assignment problems (Programming), Fairness, Countries, Stated preference methods, Political refugees |
| Abstract: | We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing commitments of member states. We identify a unique choice rule that addresses feasibility while balancing priorities and capacities. We examine the effects of both homogeneous and heterogeneous burden-sizes among asylum seekers on the matching process. Our main result shows that when all asylum seekers are treated as having identical burden-sizes, the asylum-seeker-proposing cumulative offer mechanism guarantees both stability and strategy-proofness. In contrast, when burden-sizes vary, there are scenarios where achieving stability or strategy-proofness is no longer possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Business Source Index |
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