Academic Journal
Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies "Support for the Weak" Phenomenon.
| Τίτλος: | Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies "Support for the Weak" Phenomenon. |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Ge, Chao1, Li, Mengyuan2, Wang, Yangyang3, Su, Wunhong4 whsu@hdu.edu.cn |
| Πηγή: | Journal for East European Management Studies. Jun2026, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p1-18. 18p. |
| Θεματικοί όροι: | *Subsidies, *Management controls, *Energy industries, Chinese corporations, Responsibility |
| Γεωγραφικοί όροι: | China |
| Περίληψη: | The effective utilization of Government Subsidies funds has long been a focal concern for both scholars and policymakers, while elucidating the underlying mechanisms behind the government's preferential support for vulnerable groups serves as a crucial foundation for mitigating and managing associated risks. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2023, this study examines the relationship between firms' Internal Controls quality and the government subsidies they receive. The results indicate that higher Internal Controls quality is associated with lower levels of government subsidies. Mechanism test results suggest that this negative correlation primarily stems from the fact that Internal Controls can mitigate a firm's inclination to assume political obligations in exchange for government subsidies while simultaneously enhancing competitiveness and thereby reducing excessive dependence on governmental support. Further research results indicate that when firms belong to the new energy industry or receive innovation-related subsidies, the inhibitory effect of Internal Controls on government subsidies is weakened. This study elucidates the formation mechanism underlying the "support for the weak" phenomenon in Government Subsidies allocation. By integrating firm-level agency behavior and strategic choice, this study supplements the extant literature with a micro-level explanation, revealing that subsidy distribution is a bilateral matching process between the government and firms. These findings offer valuable insights into the interplay between firms and government subsidies, informing more rational policymaking and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Journal for East European Management Studies is the property of IMR Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | Business Source Index |
καταχωρήστε σχόλιο πρώτοι!