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Motivational investments and financial incentives.

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Τίτλος: Motivational investments and financial incentives.
Συγγραφείς: Ghatak, Maitreesh1 (AUTHOR), Wahhaj, Zaki2 (AUTHOR)
Πηγή: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. Jul2026, Vol. 42 Issue 2, p568-604. 37p.
Θεματικοί όροι: *Employee motivation, *Labor costs, *Monetary incentives, *Contract theory, Inspiration, Guilt (Psychology), Incentive (Psychology)
Περίληψη: If firms can invest in the motivation of workers to undertake costly effort, how does that affect the choice of explicit financial incentives? We develop a simple principal–agent model where the standard optimal contract is to offer a bonus that trades off incentive provision versus rent extraction. We allow the principal to undertake two types of motivational investments—one that increases the agent's disutility from deviating from a prescribed effort level, and another that reduces the cost of effort. We refer to these as guilt and inspiration, respectively. We characterize the conditions under which motivational investments and financial incentives are substitutes and complements, and find that it depends on the type of the investment as well as whether the worker's participation constraint is binding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Βάση Δεδομένων: Business Source Index
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  Data: Motivational investments and financial incentives.
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  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Employee+motivation%22">Employee motivation</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Labor+costs%22">Labor costs</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Monetary+incentives%22">Monetary incentives</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Contract+theory%22">Contract theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Inspiration%22">Inspiration</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Guilt+%28Psychology%29%22">Guilt (Psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Incentive+%28Psychology%29%22">Incentive (Psychology)</searchLink>
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  Data: If firms can invest in the motivation of workers to undertake costly effort, how does that affect the choice of explicit financial incentives? We develop a simple principal–agent model where the standard optimal contract is to offer a bonus that trades off incentive provision versus rent extraction. We allow the principal to undertake two types of motivational investments—one that increases the agent's disutility from deviating from a prescribed effort level, and another that reduces the cost of effort. We refer to these as guilt and inspiration, respectively. We characterize the conditions under which motivational investments and financial incentives are substitutes and complements, and find that it depends on the type of the investment as well as whether the worker's participation constraint is binding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1093/jleo/ewaf008
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 37
        StartPage: 568
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Employee motivation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Labor costs
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Monetary incentives
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Contract theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Inspiration
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Guilt (Psychology)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Incentive (Psychology)
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Motivational investments and financial incentives.
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            NameFull: Ghatak, Maitreesh
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            NameFull: Wahhaj, Zaki
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 07
              Text: Jul2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
          Identifiers:
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              Value: 87566222
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              Value: 42
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            – TitleFull: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization
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