Bibliographic Details
| Title: |
The Chair Allocation problem. |
| Authors: |
Bloch, Francis1 (AUTHOR) francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr, Cantala, David2 (AUTHOR) dcantala@colmex.mx, Gibaja, Damián3 (AUTHOR) damianemilio.gibaja@upaep.mx |
| Source: |
Social Choice & Welfare. Jun2026, Vol. 66 Issue 4, p995-1028. 34p. |
| Subject Terms: |
*Algorithms, Matching theory, Assignment problems (Programming), Fairness, Research personnel |
| Abstract: |
We introduce the Chair Allocation problem, a three-sided matching market where researchers apply for a chair in a university, and universities request chairs (composed of a university and a research topic) to a central authority. We propose a new algorithm, the Chair Nested Deferred Acceptance algorithm, and show that it is fair, undominated by other fair assignments, and strategy-proof for researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: |
Business Source Index |