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Fair Congested Assignment.

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Τίτλος: Fair Congested Assignment.
Συγγραφείς: Bogomolnaia, Anna1 (AUTHOR) anna.bogomolnaia@glasgow.ac.uk, Moulin, Hervé1 (AUTHOR) herve.moulin@glasgow.ac.uk
Πηγή: Mathematics of Operations Research (INFORMS). May2026, Vol. 51 Issue 2, p1061-1079. 19p.
Θεματικοί όροι: Fairness, Assignment problems (Programming)
Περίληψη: We must assign n agents to m posts subject to negative congestion; what assignment is fair and efficient? If congestion is anonymous (each agent adds one unit), it is always possible to assign each agent to one of the agent's top n out of the n×m feasible allocations. This ordinal interpretation of ex ante fairness can be adjusted if congestion is weighted (agent-specific). An assignment is competitive if I don't want to move to an empty post or to an occupied one at its current congestion level. If it exists, the competitive assignment is essentially unique, efficient, and ex ante fair. Among agents endowed with cardinal expected utilities, we can randomize the selection of our assignment. Under anonymous congestion, every problem has a unique competitive congestion profile implemented by a mixture of deterministic assignments, rounding up or down the competitive congestion, and approximately ex ante fair, efficient, and welfare equivalent. Some of these properties are lost under weighted congestion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Mathematics of Operations Research (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: We must assign n agents to m posts subject to negative congestion; what assignment is fair and efficient? If congestion is anonymous (each agent adds one unit), it is always possible to assign each agent to one of the agent's top n out of the n×m feasible allocations. This ordinal interpretation of ex ante fairness can be adjusted if congestion is weighted (agent-specific). An assignment is competitive if I don't want to move to an empty post or to an occupied one at its current congestion level. If it exists, the competitive assignment is essentially unique, efficient, and ex ante fair. Among agents endowed with cardinal expected utilities, we can randomize the selection of our assignment. Under anonymous congestion, every problem has a unique competitive congestion profile implemented by a mixture of deterministic assignments, rounding up or down the competitive congestion, and approximately ex ante fair, efficient, and welfare equivalent. Some of these properties are lost under weighted congestion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Mathematics of Operations Research (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1287/moor.2024.0581
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 19
        StartPage: 1061
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Fairness
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Assignment problems (Programming)
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      – TitleFull: Fair Congested Assignment.
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              Text: May2026
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              Y: 2026
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