Academic Journal
Frontiers: Content Quality Provision and Welfare Implications of Digital Platform Commission Fees.
| Τίτλος: | Frontiers: Content Quality Provision and Welfare Implications of Digital Platform Commission Fees. |
|---|---|
| Συγγραφείς: | Sharma, Siddhartha1 (AUTHOR) sishar@iu.edu, Mehra, Amit2 (AUTHOR) amit.mehra@utdallas.edu |
| Πηγή: | Marketing Science (INFORMS). Mar/Apr2026, Vol. 45 Issue 2, p249-257. 9p. |
| Θεματικοί όροι: | *Digital platforms, *Consumers' surplus, *Game theory, *Transaction costs, *Market design & structure (Economics), Creative ability |
| Περίληψη: | Several digital content developers, including Epic Games and Spotify, have voiced concerns that the commission fees charged by platforms (e.g., Apple's App Store, Sony PlayStation) are too high and stifle innovation. Therefore, they advocate for a reduction in the commission rates. This paper employs a game-theoretic model to analyze a platform ecosystem comprising two competing platforms, hardware devices compatible with these platforms, and a representative content developer to examine whether reducing commission rates improves content quality provision and consumer surplus. Our findings reveal that reducing the commission rate may not always enhance content quality. Moreover, even when a lower commission rate reduces content quality, the developer may still be better off. We also find that consumer surplus may decrease as the commission rate declines. These results are primarily driven by platforms raising device prices when commissions decrease, thereby contracting the developer's effective market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Marketing Science (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Βάση Δεδομένων: | Business Source Index |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 CustomLinks: – Url: http://www.jstor.org/openurl?issn=07322399&date=2026&volume=45&issue=2&spage=249 Name: JSTOR (all content) (s7799221) Category: fullText Text: Icon: https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/branding/jstor/iconJSTOR.gif MouseOverText: Full Text from JSTOR |
|---|---|
| Header | DbId: bsx DbLabel: Business Source Index An: 192514562 RelevancyScore: 1470 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 1470.35424804688 |
| IllustrationInfo | |
| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Frontiers: Content Quality Provision and Welfare Implications of Digital Platform Commission Fees. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Sharma%2C+Siddhartha%22">Sharma, Siddhartha</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> sishar@iu.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Mehra%2C+Amit%22">Mehra, Amit</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> amit.mehra@utdallas.edu</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Marketing+Science+%28INFORMS%29%22">Marketing Science (INFORMS)</searchLink>. Mar/Apr2026, Vol. 45 Issue 2, p249-257. 9p. – Name: Subject Label: Subject Terms Group: Su Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Digital+platforms%22">Digital platforms</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Consumers'+surplus%22">Consumers' surplus</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Game+theory%22">Game theory</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Transaction+costs%22">Transaction costs</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Market+design+%26+structure+%28Economics%29%22">Market design & structure (Economics)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creative+ability%22">Creative ability</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Several digital content developers, including Epic Games and Spotify, have voiced concerns that the commission fees charged by platforms (e.g., Apple's App Store, Sony PlayStation) are too high and stifle innovation. Therefore, they advocate for a reduction in the commission rates. This paper employs a game-theoretic model to analyze a platform ecosystem comprising two competing platforms, hardware devices compatible with these platforms, and a representative content developer to examine whether reducing commission rates improves content quality provision and consumer surplus. Our findings reveal that reducing the commission rate may not always enhance content quality. Moreover, even when a lower commission rate reduces content quality, the developer may still be better off. We also find that consumer surplus may decrease as the commission rate declines. These results are primarily driven by platforms raising device prices when commissions decrease, thereby contracting the developer's effective market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Marketing Science (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsx&AN=192514562 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1287/mksc.2024.1084 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 9 StartPage: 249 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Digital platforms Type: general – SubjectFull: Consumers' surplus Type: general – SubjectFull: Game theory Type: general – SubjectFull: Transaction costs Type: general – SubjectFull: Market design & structure (Economics) Type: general – SubjectFull: Creative ability Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Frontiers: Content Quality Provision and Welfare Implications of Digital Platform Commission Fees. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Sharma, Siddhartha – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Mehra, Amit IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 03 Text: Mar/Apr2026 Type: published Y: 2026 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 07322399 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 45 – Type: issue Value: 2 Titles: – TitleFull: Marketing Science (INFORMS) Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |