| Abstract: |
This article explores whether Stephen Biddle’s military power and nonstate warfare models capture strategic and operational dynamics at play in nonstate actors’ (NSAs) use of advanced armed drones (AADs). It outlines how three factors significantly limit the strategic utility of advanced armed UAVs for NSAs: presence, patrons, and purpose. These factors dictate the extent to which the logistics surrounding advanced drones is sustainable for NSAs; provide access to technology, know-how, and training; and determine how effective and successful the offensive employment of AADs can be. Victory, in Biddle’s view, comes through the pursuit of cover, concealment, and dispersion, among other elements, all geared towards the maximisation of lethality; in addition, Biddle claims access to advanced technology has made nonstate actors converge towards the modern system and adopt more conventional combat practices, also developed with maximal lethality as the optimal desirable effect. Through these lenses, however, advanced armed drones in the hands of NSAs appear to be a departure from the modern system, rather than a step towards its adoption, making their end users more conspicuous, dependent, and overall exposed to enemy activities; there is also no indication that nonstate actors may be abandoning asymmetric approaches in favour of maximal lethality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |