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Doomsday or Multiverse Bias.

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Τίτλος: Doomsday or Multiverse Bias.
Συγγραφείς: Isaacs, Yoaav1 (AUTHOR) Yoaav_Isaacs@baylor.edu
Πηγή: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research. May2026, Vol. 112 Issue 3, p608-616. 9p.
Θεματικοί όροι: *Multiverse theory, *Epistemics, *Philosophy of science, *Theory of knowledge, *Hypothesis
Περίληψη: Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors hypotheses positing vastly more observers (Multiverse Bias). Since the underlying assumptions are hard to deny, and both horns of the dilemma are deeply unpalatable, this result reveals a major problem for Bayesian epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Βάση Δεδομένων: Academic Search Index
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  – Url: http://www.jstor.org/openurl?issn=00318205&date=2026&volume=112&issue=3&spage=608
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  Data: Doomsday or Multiverse Bias.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Philosophy+%26+Phenomenological+Research%22">Philosophy & Phenomenological Research</searchLink>. May2026, Vol. 112 Issue 3, p608-616. 9p.
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  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Multiverse+theory%22">Multiverse theory</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Epistemics%22">Epistemics</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Philosophy+of+science%22">Philosophy of science</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Theory+of+knowledge%22">Theory of knowledge</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Hypothesis%22">Hypothesis</searchLink>
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  Data: Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors hypotheses positing vastly more observers (Multiverse Bias). Since the underlying assumptions are hard to deny, and both horns of the dilemma are deeply unpalatable, this result reveals a major problem for Bayesian epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1111/phpr.70103
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 9
        StartPage: 608
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Multiverse theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Epistemics
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Philosophy of science
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Theory of knowledge
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      – SubjectFull: Hypothesis
        Type: general
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      – TitleFull: Doomsday or Multiverse Bias.
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            – D: 01
              M: 05
              Text: May2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
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              Value: 112
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            – TitleFull: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
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