Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks

Συγγραφείς: van den Brink, René, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

Συνεισφορές: Label, Lucie, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Amsterdam (VU), Tinbergen Institute, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), European Project: 956107,H2020-EU.1.3.1. - Fostering new skills by means of excellent initial training of researchers,H2020-MSCA-ITN-2020,EPOC(2021)

Πηγή: European Journal of Operational Research

Θεματικοί όροι: weighted network, Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, 7. Clean energy, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 12. Responsible consumption, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility function, Group decisions and negociations, 11. Sustainability, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C0 - General/C.C0.C02 - Mathematical Methods, expected utility function, 2. Zero hunger, ddc:330, 9. Industry and infrastructure, 1. No poverty, externalities, neutrality to ordinary risk, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, degree, Group decisions and negotiations, D81, Knowledge, Weighted graph, Degree centrality, 8. Economic growth, C02, [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences, D85, centrality measure, Cooperative game

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/5f86feac-b49b-4d4f-9af5-edde04f5c378
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2024.06.042
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/5f86feac-b49b-4d4f-9af5-edde04f5c378
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/8aaa2722-90ac-4b26-8405-06431bbeb541
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/8aaa2722-90ac-4b26-8405-06431bbeb541
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/282874
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04974975v1/document
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04974975v1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2024.06.042

Social networks and economic transformation: Evidence from a resettled village in Brazil

Συγγραφείς: Comola, Margherita, Inguaggiato, Carla, Mendola, Mariapia

Συνεισφορές: Bauer, Caroline, Université Paris-Saclay, Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Universität Bern = University of Bern = Université de Berne (UNIBE), Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca (UNIMIB), Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), ANR-17-EURE-0001,PGSE,Ecole d'Economie de Paris(2017), ANR-21-CE26-0002,LinkLab,Comment choisir ses partenaires? Preuves expérimentales sur la formation des liens numériques(2021)

Πηγή: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 221:17-34

Θεματικοί όροι: JEL: O - Economic Development, Social networks, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics/C.C4.C45 - Neural Networks and Related Topics, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Reform • Land Use • Irrigation • Agriculture and Environment, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, Indigenous Peoples, Innovation, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 2. Zero hunger, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes, 9. Industry and infrastructure, Races, 1. No poverty, 15. Life on land, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Technological Change, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J15 - Economics of Minorities, Knowledge, Agrarian reform, Brazil, Peer effects, Technology adoption, and Immigrants • Non-labor Discrimination

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/521926
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.001
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04571235v1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.001

A dynamic analysis of criminal networks

Συγγραφείς: Colombo, Luca, Labrecciosa, Paola, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

Συνεισφορές: Rennes School of Business (Rennes SB), ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School (ESSCA), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)

Πηγή: ISSN: 0022-0531.

Θεματικοί όροι: Differential games, Markov equilibrium, Criminal networks, Bonacich centrality, Key player, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-04850675
https://hal.science/hal-04850675v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-04850675v1/file/A%20dynamic%20analysis%20of%20criminal%20networks.pdf
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105951

Group Dominant Networks and Convexity

Συγγραφείς: Bravard, Christophe, Sarangi, Sudipta, Tzavellas, Hector

Συνεισφορές: Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Virginia Tech Blacksburg

Πηγή: ISSN: 0304-4068 ; Journal of Mathematical Economics ; https://hal.science/hal-05021148 ; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2025, 118, pp.103116. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116⟩.

Θεματικοί όροι: Pairwise equilibrium networks, Convexity, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C70 - General, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-05021148
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116

Targeting in social networks with anonymized information

Συγγραφείς: Bloch, Francis, Shabayek, Shaden

Συνεισφορές: Bauer, Caroline, Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Pôle d'expertise de la régulation numérique (PEReN)

Πηγή: Games and Economic Behavior. 141:380-402

Θεματικοί όροι: Targeting, 05 social sciences, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Mechanism design, and Design/D.D4.D42 - Monopoly, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Social networks, Firm Strategy, FOS: Economics and business, Knowledge, 0504 sociology, 0502 economics and business, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Privacy protection, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), and Market Performance/L.L1.L14 - Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Pricing

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.03122

Peer effects, self-selection and dishonesty

Συγγραφείς: Charroin, Liza, Fortin, Bernard, Villeval, Marie Claire

Συνεισφορές: Villeval, Marie Claire, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Laval Québec (ULaval), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), ANR-16-IDEX-0005,IDEXLYON,IDEXLYON(2016)

Πηγή: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 200:618-637

Θεματικοί όροι: JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, 05 social sciences, Self-selection, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Homophily, Group Behavior, Experiment, Knowledge, Dishonesty, Peer effects, 0502 economics and business, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

False Cascades and the Cost of Truth

Συγγραφείς: Cheredina, Darina, Lukyanov, Georgy

Συνεισφορές: Unknown, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Πηγή: https://hal.science/hal-05322294 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Informational cascades, Verification, Misinformation, Conformity, Dis-closure, Social learning, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-05322294
https://hal.science/hal-05322294v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-05322294v1/file/wp_tse_1681.pdf

Resolutions in a system of financially linked firms: relying on coarse information

Συγγραφείς: Demange, Gabrielle

Συνεισφορές: Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC), Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE)

Πηγή: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191187 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: cross-liabilities, defaults, bankruptcy, resolution, proportionality, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G33 - Bankruptcy • Liquidation, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G38 - Government Policy and Regulation, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191187
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191187v1/document
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191187v1/file/WP_2025-26_.pdf

The Dark Side of Peers: Demotivation through Social Comparison in Networks

Συγγραφείς: Deroïan, Frédéric, Belhaj, Mohamed

Συνεισφορές: Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017)

Πηγή: https://hal.science/hal-05075017 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Social Comparison, Demotivation, Networks, Strategic Substitutes, Equilibrium Welfare, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-05075017
https://hal.science/hal-05075017v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-05075017v1/file/wp_2025_nr_11.pdf

Addiction in networks

Συγγραφείς: Deroïan, Frédéric, Escudie, Philippine

Συνεισφορές: Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), A*MIDEX, ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-18-CE26-0020,MaRiNe,Gestion du Risque sur les Réseaux(2018)

Πηγή: https://hal.science/hal-05007080 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Addiction, Peer Network, rational addiction, time-inconsistency, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-05007080
https://hal.science/hal-05007080v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-05007080v1/file/wp_2025_nr_06%20.pdf

Contrarian Motives in Social Learning

Συγγραφείς: Ivanik, Vasilii, Lukyanov, Georgy

Συνεισφορές: International College of Economics and Finance (ICEF, NRU HSE), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-11-LABX-0047,ECODEC,Réguler l'économie au service de la société(2011)

Πηγή: https://hal.science/hal-05319432 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Endogenous information acquisition, Nonconformity, Popularity, Bayesian thresholds, Information cascades, Social learning, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-05319432
https://hal.science/hal-05319432v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-05319432v1/file/wp_tse_1679.pdf

Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention

Συγγραφείς: Demange, Gabrielle

Συνεισφορές: Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC), Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris)-Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE)

Πηγή: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191177 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: communication, dedicated attention, social network, Star, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D49 - Other, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191177
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191177v1/document
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05191177v1/file/WP_2025-25_.pdf

Diffusion in Dynamic Networks with Continuous Inputs to Allocate Responsibility

Συγγραφείς: van den Ende, Rosa, Laplace Mermoud, Dylan

Συνεισφορές: Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University, École Nationale Supérieure de Techniques Avancées (ENSTA), Institut Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), CEDRIC. Optimisation Combinatoire (CEDRIC - OC), Centre d'études et de recherche en informatique et communications (CEDRIC), Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Informatique pour l'Industrie et l'Entreprise (ENSIIE)-Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers Cnam (Cnam)-Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Informatique pour l'Industrie et l'Entreprise (ENSIIE)-Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers Cnam (Cnam)

Πηγή: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05046082 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Dynamic networks, Laplacian, Allocation of responsibility, Diffusion, Climate policy, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05046082
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05046082v1/document
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05046082v1/file/25008.pdf

Network Centrality and Device Ecosystems

Συγγραφείς: Jeon, Doh-Shin, Lefouili, Yassine, Li, Yaxin, Simcoe, Timothy

Συνεισφορές: Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse (Comue de Toulouse)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Boston University Boston (BU), National Bureau of Economic Research New York (NBER), The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), ANR-17-EURE-0001,PGSE,Ecole d'Economie de Paris(2017)

Πηγή: https://hal.science/hal-04963181 ; 2025.

Θεματικοί όροι: Ecosystem, Multi-sided Market, Network, Centrality, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D41 - Perfect Competition, and Design/D.D4.D42 - Monopoly, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L12 - Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-04963181
https://hal.science/hal-04963181v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-04963181v1/file/wp_tse_1468.pdf

On the Design of Public Debate in Social Networks

Συγγραφείς: Grabisch, Michel, Mandel, Antoine, Rusinowska, Agnieszka

Συνεισφορές: Grabisch, Michel, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Πηγή: Operations Research. 71:626-648

Θεματικοί όροι: polarization, 05 social sciences, 0211 other engineering and technologies, institution design, 02 engineering and technology, [INFO.INFO-DM]Computer Science [cs]/Discrete Mathematics [cs.DM], [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, network fragility, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, 0506 political science, [INFO.INFO-DM] Computer Science [cs]/Discrete Mathematics [cs.DM], Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, opinion dynamics, political campaign, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, network formation

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03881461v1
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2356
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03881461v1/document

A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions

Συγγραφείς: Ollar, Mariann, Penta, Antonio

Συνεισφορές: DSR-SCD-UT1C, Service Publications, The University of Edinburgh, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Πηγή: Ollar, M & Penta, A 2023, ' A network solution to robust implementation : The case of identical but unknown distributions ', The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 90, no. 5, rdac084, pp. 2517–2554 . https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac084
Review of Economic Studies

Θεματικοί όροι: Identical but Unknown Distributions, Identical but unknown distributions, network design, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities, Interdependent values, 0502 economics and business, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, rationalizability, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, robust full implementation, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, spectral radius, 05 social sciences, uniqueness, Robust full implementation, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Robust Full Implementation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, strategic externalities, Knowledge, Interdependent Values, identical but unknown distributions, Rationalizability

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11820/f3a9d314-ac73-4b4c-8470-f1c89d9d595c
https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/376589970/OllarMPentaA2023RESANetworkSolution.pdf
https://hal.science/hal-04198678v1
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac084

Attack and interception in networks

Συγγραφείς: Bloch, Francis, Chatterjee, Kalyan, Dutta, Bhaskar

Συνεισφορές: Bauer, Caroline, Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Pennsylvania State University (Penn State), Penn State System, University of Warwick Coventry, Ashoka University

Πηγή: Theoretical Economics. 18:1511-1546

Θεματικοί όροι: Network interdiction, the Legal System, ddc:330, K42, JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, attack and defense, Attack and defense, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Inspection games, C72, Knowledge, inspection games, networks, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, Networks, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, D85

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/168997/2/WRAP-Attack-interception-networks-22.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296446

The Network Origin of Slow Labor Reallocation

Συγγραφείς: Bocquet, Leonard

Συνεισφορές: DSpace at Cambridge pro (8.1), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE)

Θεματικοί όροι: and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J62 - Job, Incidence, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Occupational, Duration, Knowledge, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J24 - Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity, Unemployment, and Intergenerational Mobility, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, Vacancies, and Job Search, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J64 - Unemployment: Models

Περιγραφή αρχείου: application/pdf

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/377418
https://doi.org/10.17863/cam.114236

Anatomy of a techno-creative community – the role of brokers, places, and events in the emergence of projection mapping in Nantes

Συγγραφείς: Etienne Capron, Dominique Sagot-Duvauroux, Raphaël Suire

Συνεισφορές: Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management (GRANEM), Université d'Angers (UA)-AGROCAMPUS OUEST-Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage, Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique (LEMNA), Institut d'Économie et de Management de Nantes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes (IEMN-IAE Nantes), Université de Nantes (UN)-Université de Nantes (UN), RFI OIC - Reset project, ANR-18-CE22-0012,SCAENA,Scenes Culturelles, Ambiances Et TraNsformations urbAines(2018)

Πηγή: Rethinking Culture and Creativity in the Digital Transformation ISBN: 9781003332374

Θεματικοί όροι: places, JEL: R - Urban, JEL: O - Economic Development, 0211 other engineering and technologies, 02 engineering and technology, Real Estate, Development, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D, 0502 economics and business, Rural, Environmental Issues, brokers, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, JEL: Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z1 - Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology/Z.Z1.Z10 - General, Innovation, network analysis, and Transportation Economics/R.R1 - General Regional Economics/R.R1.R11 - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, and Changes, 05 social sciences, techno-creative innovation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Technological Change, Regional, Knowledge, community, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, events

Σύνδεσμος πρόσβασης: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03323847
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09654313.2021.1959901

Formal insurance and altruism networks

Συγγραφείς: Bene, Tizié, Bramoullé, Yann, Deroïan, Frédéric

Συνεισφορές: Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-18-CE26-0020,MaRiNe,Gestion du Risque sur les Réseaux(2018), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011)

Πηγή: ISSN: 0304-3878.

Θεματικοί όροι: Altruism networks, Informal transfers, Formal insurance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Διαθεσιμότητα: https://hal.science/hal-04717990
https://hal.science/hal-04717990v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-04717990v1/file/1-s2.0-S0304387824000841-main.pdf
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103335